Experimental, in testing

Pseudonymise your data before the ChatGPT, Claude or Gemini APIs

Your teams want to use the best models on the market, but those APIs send your data to third-party vendors. We are currently developing and testing an pseudonymisation layer that masks sensitive data before it is sent, then restores it when the answer comes back, so as to limit leaks while keeping the power of these models.

Status: experimental, in testing, currently in the testing phase. The elements presented below describe the approach we are validating before opening it up in production.

The problem: every prompt is a potential leak

As soon as a user copies a document into ChatGPT, Claude or Gemini, the data leaves your perimeter: surname, first name, email address, IP address, case file number, health data and more. That information travels and can be retained by the vendor. For many organisations this is unacceptable, but banning these tools only pushes people towards shadow IT.

The approach we are testing: mask, send, restore

  1. Detection of sensitive data

    An engine automatically spots personal data in the text: names, emails, IP addresses, numbers, addresses and more.

  2. Replacement with tokens

    Detected data is replaced with tokens. Undetected identifiers and identifying context may remain.

  3. Sending to the third-party API

    Only the pseudonymised text is transmitted to ChatGPT, Claude or Gemini. The mapping table stays with you.

  4. Restoration on receipt

    The response is restored locally using the mapping table. Masking does not guarantee that the transmitted text contains no personal data.

The round trip, in one diagram

Only the masked text crosses the boundary. The mapping table, used to restore values, must remain within your infrastructure with restricted access. Context may nevertheless allow reidentification without that table.

ON YOUR SIDE · your infrastructure THIRD-PARTY API Original text “Jean Dupont, case file no. 74123” ① masking Masked text “[PERSON_1], case file [REF_1]” Restoration tokens → real values → complete answer, in the clear Mapping table [PERSON_1] → Jean Dupont the key: stays with you Third-party API ChatGPT · Claude · Gemini ② sent: masked text only ③ answer (still masked)
The response is restored locally using the mapping table. Masking does not guarantee that the transmitted text contains no personal data.

A concrete example

  1. Original text (stays with you)

    “Please get back to Jean Dupont at j.dupont@ville.fr about case file no. 74123.”

  2. Sent to the API (pseudonymised)

    “Please get back to [PERSON_1] at [EMAIL_1] about case file [REF_1].”

  3. Restored answer (user side)

    “A follow-up email has been drafted for Jean Dupont (j.dupont@ville.fr), case file no. 74123.”

Defence in depth, not a miracle cure

Pseudonymisation sharply reduces the exposure of personal data, but it does not replace a sovereign AI: detection is never 100 % perfect, and the channel is still that of a third-party vendor. It is an excellent complement when the use of external APIs is unavoidable.

For full control, the best answer remains sovereign AI hosted in house, where the question of leakage no longer arises.

Take part in the testing phase

This solution is experimental (testing phase under way). Contact us to be told when it opens, or to take part in the trials with your own use cases.

Data protection: scope and status

The pseudonymisation gateway for external APIs is experimental and in testing; it is not advertised as production-ready. The mapping table allows restoration: data remains personal and GDPR still applies. Test detection and re-identification on the actual corpus.